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SCOTTISH FOOTBALL AND COLONIAL ZIMBABWE: SPORT, THE SCOTTISH DIASPORA, AND 
‘WHITE AFRICA’ 
 
MATTHEW L. McDOWELL 
University of Edinburgh 
 
(This is the text of a pre-publication print of: Matthew L. McDowell, ‘Scottish Football and 
Colonial Zimbabwe: Sport, the Scottish Diaspora, and ‘White Africa’, Journal of Scottish 
Historical Studies 37 (1) (April 2017): 73-99. There may be small textual differences 
between this version and the published version. Any reference made to this paper should 
refer to the published version.) 
 
Abstract 
In 1969 and 1970 respectively, Clyde and Kilmarnock Football Clubs embarked on highly 
controversial tours of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), then in conflict with the UK over its failure 
to enact a timetable for majority, non-white rule, and its 1965 unilateral declaration of 
independence to protect such a system. Despite defying the wishes of the UK Government, 
these tours were covered very little in Scottish newspapers, and there was little sustained 
public outcry. This article examines the uneven Scottish and Westminster reactions to the 
tours (in particular, Kilmarnock’s) in the context of broader policies and movements against 
Rhodesian and South African sport. It also examines Rhodesian press accounts of the trips, 
which stressed communion with elements of the Scottish diaspora within Rhodesian civic 
society. It also addresses the tours’ place within the broader context of work, race and 
migration during the period 1965-80, where the Rhodesian Front government and its white 
settler supporters were under continual siege from a multi-pronged nationalist resistance. 
Critically, this article asks whether or not Scotland and indeed Scottish sport can be 
extricated from the horrors of decolonisation, in a region where both had deep historic 
roots. 
 
Introduction 
1970 was a year in which Scottish sport was thrust into an uncomfortable international 
spotlight. From 16 to 26 July, the city of Edinburgh was to host for the first time the British 
Commonwealth Games, a sporting competition which showcased athletes from the British 
Commonwealth participating in a variety of events. And, unlike in the Olympics, in this 
competition Scots were able to watch their favourite athletes competing under a Scottish – 
rather than British – banner. And indeed, the gathering would largely be remembered very 
positively: Prince Philip would dub these ‘The Friendly Games’: not just a reference to the 
Commonwealth ‘family’, but also to the atmosphere, perceived to be more laid back than 
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that of the Olympics or the World Cup. However, as the competition’s former name of 
‘British Empire Games’ implies, the gathering was also a reflection of the complexities of 
decolonisation, and indicative of the increasingly fragmented nature of ‘British’ national 
politics circa 1970.1 That same summer, the South African cricket team – banned from 
international competition for the nation’s maintenance of Apartheid – were invited by the 
Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC) to tour England. Activists for the UK’s Anti-Apartheid 
Movement (AAM), in particularly a new direct action-oriented campaign known as the Stop 
the Seventy Tour (STST) led by South African exile Peter Hain, promised and later delivered a 
widespread programme of civil disobedience in conjunction with the tour, which included 
pitch invasions and disruption of play.2 By the end of April, the South African Non-Racial 
Olympic Committee (SANROC), a pressure group of South African exiles, were actively 
beginning to organise a boycott of the Games – one which would involve African, Asian, and 
Caribbean nations – unless Prime Minister Harold Wilson forced the cancellation of the 
South African cricket tour.3 
 
By the end of May, Wilson, under tremendous pressure and with a hastily-called June 
general election looming (one that his Labour Party would eventually lose), eventually 
stepped in to do so. However, this was not before other solutions to the crisis were mooted, 
in particular by the upstart, pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP), which 
suggested banning England, whose governing body of cricket had invited the Springboks, 
from the upcoming Games. Dr. David Stevenson, the SNP’s overseas secretary, played upon 
the foreign-ness of cricket when stating that: ‘Cricket is of little interest in Scotland… English 
cricket teams…are not referred to as British or United Kingdom teams’.4 Winnie Ewing, the 
party’s recently-elected MP, told the Ugandan high commissioner, Paul Orono Etiang, that: 
‘We are a non-racial society in Scotland. It is pretty hard luck that we are suffering for the 
sins of our neighbour. I think it ought to be recognised that Scotland is a separate entity’.5 
Stevenson, after all, was right: cricket was nowhere near as popular north of the Border, and 
could not legitimately be described as analogous with English cricket.6 It certainly did not 
have the mass popularity and cultural cache of football, very much the game of Scotland’s 
working-class males.7 
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And one would certainly never confuse the likes of Clyde and Kilmarnock Football Clubs for 
the MCC, despite Kilmarnock’s admitted recent successes in Scottish football. Whilst the 
1960s represented the zenith of the Ayrshire club’s attainment in both league and cup 
football in Scotland, Kilmarnock, along with Scotland’s other smaller professional clubs, 
were dwarfed in popularity and resources by Glasgow’s ‘Old Firm’ Celtic and Rangers 
Football Clubs, representing as they did two sides of an ethno-religious divide amongst the 
Scottish working class, in relation to historic migration between Scotland and Ireland.8 And 
yet, the idea that Scotland had little to do with Africa’s white-supremacist regimes would 
nevertheless be severely tested by Glasgow’s Clyde and ‘Killie’, very much community clubs 
which embarked on controversial tours of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in the late 
spring/summer of 1969 and 1970 respectively, at exactly the same time (in the case of the 
latter) as the scale of the potential Commonwealth Games boycott was becoming apparent.  
 
This article uses sport as a lens of examining the post-war relationship of Scotland and the 
former British Empire. The primary focus will be on the Clyde and (to a greater extent) the 
Kilmarnock tours of Rhodesia. However, it will contextualise both within broader patterns 
and trends. First, it will focus on reactions to the Kilmarnock tour both within Scotland, and 
at Westminster and Whitehall within the broader context of anti-Apartheid. Next, it 
examines the presence of the Scottish diaspora within Zimbabwe, as framed by Rhodesia’s 
daily newspapers, as Scots based within the country’s football and political apparatus were 
amongst those who coaxed the clubs into coming over. Connected to this, the tours must be 
viewed in both the context of post-war ‘European’ immigration to Zimbabwe (encouraged 
by the regime), and broader currents within global labour history, relating to explicit and 
subaltern discourses of race and migration within the Rhodesian press. It is crucial to state 
these tours are a small snippet of what was probably occurring – not just within sport, but 
within broader cultural and economic spheres – between Scotland and Zimbabwe during 
the post-war period. It is hoped that this article might stimulate more research into this 
subject, and should actively seek to challenge the idea that Scotland and its diaspora were 
neither witnesses nor active participants in some of the more unsettling aspects of the 
decolonisation of the British Empire. 
 
Background – Post-UDI Rhodesia 
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November 1965 saw the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) of Rhodesia from the 
United Kingdom. The territory that had been known as Southern Rhodesia had formerly 
been a part of the British South African Company created in 1889, and initially led by Cecil 
Rhodes.9 Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi), also part of the same 
territory, had gained their independence after the collapse of the ten-year Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963.10 Rhodesia, as led by the right-wing Rhodesian Front (RF) 
government of Prime Minister Ian Smith, the son of a Scottish settler, enacted UDI to resist 
the attempts of the British Labour government under Wilson to set a timetable for a return 
to majority black rule in the colony. The UK, as a result, cut ties with Rhodesia and enacted 
economic sanctions.11 
 
While not practicing a system of segregation as elaborate as South Africa’s Apartheid, 
Rhodesia nevertheless practiced visible and widespread secondary discrimination in 
housing, property ownership, education, health, wages, and employment that reinforced a 
system of white-only (‘European’) rule: black Zimbabweans (‘Africans’) were not allowed to 
participate in meaningful government, nor to own land outwith designated areas. In the 
post-UDI nation, such segregation was more explicitly enshrined in law in 1969’s new 
constitution and the Land Tenure Act. Despite a growing black urban middle-class around 
the period of UDI, black Zimbabweans were not allowed to control any of the levers of the 
economy. Meanwhile, the Smith government, like South Africa, encouraged European 
whites to emigrate to Rhodesia for higher wages and what was perceived to be a higher 
overall quality of life. Labour unions, like much else in Smith’s Rhodesia, were split along 
explicitly racial lines.12 A split in Zimbabwean nationalism caused two nationalist resistance 
movements, the Maoist Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the USSR-backed 
Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), both of whom fought a guerrilla campaign against 
the Smith regime, eventually uniting under the banner of the Patriotic Front (PF). It was only 
in 1978, near the end of the bloody civil war, that Smith reluctantly formed a government 
which included black legislators (with only a restricted number allowed). The war continued, 
however, and the UK – under heavy external pressure from African trading partners 
(Nigeria, in particular) was forced to broker a deal for Smith to step down, and allow for free 
elections in 1980.13 ZANU-PF were returned as the dominant party under its leader, Robert 
Mugabe, who has remained in power up until the time of writing.14 
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Sport in Rhodesia 
Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock, in their 1993 book on the dying days of ‘white Rhodesia’, 
state that the country was ‘an outdoor society’ which ‘excelled in many organised sports’ 
and ‘deified’ its sporting heroes. Accordingly, the regime emphasised active participation in 
sports, rather than spectating.15 Andrew Novak goes further, stating that sport was a tool of 
‘social acculturation and identity-formation among white settlers’, towards the end of a 
‘creation of a unified white culture’ amongst its significantly diverse settler populations.16 It 
is perhaps not surprising that Scots would be involved in football in Zimbabwe more than 
they were cricket or rugby. Historically, rugby and cricket – the latter of which had become 
especially marginal in Scotland by the early twentieth century – were crucial components of 
the white educational systems of colonial Southern Rhodesia, so much so that little African 
tradition of either sport developed. Many of Rhodesia’s leading lights believed both sports 
were essential in inculcating British values; both were also crucial in articulating Rhodesia’s 
relationship with its closest ally, South Africa.17 Association football’s place within colonial 
hierarchy, however, was different. While the game had initially been brought to the region 
by the British in the 1890s, the Rhodesian state was largely responsible for developing the 
sport from the 1920s, and did so as a means of social control, much as it did in boxing.18 It 
established parallel European and African associations, with the African associations run 
through municipalities, with a modicum of African administrative control. Football was 
especially popular in the industrial centres of Bulawayo and Wankie (now Hwange), with the 
former’s African citizens successfully boycotting the City Council’s football programme after 
the administrative seizure of its fully independent African Football Association during 1947-
48. So, rather than being successfully used as a tool for placation, grassroots football was 
increasingly used during the period as an arena for protest.19 National football in the post-
UDI period was governed within a multi-racial structure that had separate European, 
African, and ‘coloured’ vice-presidents of the Football Association of Rhodesia (FAR).20 The 
arrival and evolution of football in the Copperbelt of neighbouring Zambia followed a similar 
pattern of top-down European oversight over segregated associations and leagues which 
devolved considerable control to African administrators; only here, football was used even 
more successfully to undermine British authority. Many of the leading lights of Zambia’s 
independence movement got their first formal political experience in football, and the first 
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president after independence, Kenneth Kaunda, was keen to use the sport as a tool for 
nation-building.21 In South Africa, football was far more popular than rugby and cricket put 
together, and the phenomenon of ‘white football’ was far more successful than is generally 
acknowledged. National football in South Africa would remain explicitly segregated until 
1991; despite, as in Zimbabwe and Zambia, locally-administered associations and 
tournaments which allowed some control for non-whites.22 
 
Scots’ dominant role in creating national football cultures in the region is perhaps most 
clearly seen in Malawi, where Scottish missionaries played a crucial role in the development 
of the game from the late nineteenth century onwards.23 But Scottish football itself 
nevertheless had considerable intercourse with Zimbabwe, Zambia, and South Africa up to 
1965; and, along with migration, these relationships were typically nurtured and solidified in 
the form of tours by clubs and national teams. Before the First World War, several Scottish 
football clubs had already taken summer tours of continental Europe; and, after the war, 
Scottish clubs caught up with their English counterparts and began sending teams further 
afield.24 Sports tours abroad between different imperial dominions and territories, including 
those to and from South Africa, had a variety of purposes: popularising games and teams 
and generating profits for the hosts, of course, but also exchanging mutual values within 
class (especially within sport’s amateur/professional divide), race, and imperialism.25 
Aberdeen FC were the first overseas professional football team to visit South Africa in 1927, 
and they would return ten years later; Motherwell visited the country in 1931 and 1934. In 
the post-war period, in the first decade of Apartheid, Dundee United (1953) and Heart of 
Midlothian (1953-54) would follow.26 Peter Alegi, in fact, states that Motherwell’s 1930s 
tours to South Africa were so influential that they initiated a highly popular ‘collectivist’ 
system of football known as ‘the Motherwell style’, a term commonly used in the 
promotional material of both white and African football in the country during the period.27  
Clyde FC similarly visited Northern Rhodesia in 1947 to play an all-white side; and, on their 
visit to Zimbabwe in 1969, The Chronicle of Bulawayo reminisced about Clyde’s game in 
Southern Rhodesia on 3 May 1947, becoming ‘the first British soccer team to play in 
Bulawayo after a 14-year gap (Motherwell were the 1934 visitors)’.28 Scottish football, then, 
was at the vanguard of the game in establishing sporting contacts with the region’s white 
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regimes. By the late 1960s, when Rhodesia began expressing interest in their return, there 
was considerable history to draw upon. 
 
The tours 
Formal Scottish club tours to South Africa became rarer after the International Federation of 
Association Football (FIFA) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) banned South 
Africa from international competition in 1961 and 1963 respectively.29 Nevertheless, the UK 
Government argued that it was powerless to stop clubs from going to South Africa; it was up 
to political pressure groups, then, to organise boycotts against it. The UK’s attitude towards 
post-UDI Rhodesia was different; here, the Wilson government was an active instigator in 
helping to organise opposition to the Smith regime, a direct consequence of Rhodesia’s 
defiance of UK rule.30 But some clubs still defied the ban, and Clyde and Kilmarnock were 
certainly not the first Scottish clubs to mull over the idea of going to Rhodesia during that 
time. In late 1967, Celtic (then European Cup champions), along with Manchester United, 
were invited by the Matabeleland Football Association to attend the upcoming celebration 
of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the city of Bulawayo.31 Celtic would eventually decline 
the invitation, but not after an argument about the issue occurred within Glasgow 
Corporation’s Labour group: Councillor (and future Council leader and lord provost) Pat 
Lally, a Celtic supporter, requested that Lord Provost John Johnston intervene, stating the 
tour would bring discredit to Glasgow.32 Johnston would refuse to do so, and Westminster 
did not claim to put any ‘official’ pressure on Celtic to not accept the invitation. 33  (Civil 
service documents relating to Kilmarnock’s tour, however, show that Whitehall did bring the 
Celtic matter up with the SFA; civil servants were convinced that persuasion on the 
Association’s part worked in preventing the tour.34) After Celtic turned down the offer, 
different offers were made for Rangers and Queen’s Park to come, but to no avail.35 It can 
thus be perceived that the invitation of Clyde and Kilmarnock were consolation prizes for 
failure to get the ‘Old Firm’ to come to Rhodesia. According to records of the Minister for 
Sport in Prime Minister Edward Heath’s Conservative government, Eldon Griffiths, Celtic 
also considered heading over in 1972, but stopped short of doing so.36 The Rhodesian 
football authorities displayed persistence in trying to get Scottish clubs to come over. 
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Scottish men’s football hit both its high- and low-water marks during this period. Three 
years previous in 1967, Celtic had beaten FC Internazionale of Milan to win the European 
Champions’ Cup.37 In 1971, however, Scottish football’s worst disaster occurred when 66 
Rangers supporters were crushed to death at Ibrox Park at the end of an Old Firm match.38 
Even though they were in the Scottish First Division at the time of their 1969 tour of 
Zimbabwe, Clyde were a marginal force in the history of Scottish football, and the late 1960s 
were a time of change: their home at Shawfield Park in Rutherglen – a greyhound-racing 
track – was one of the major landmarks left standing after a massive slum clearance 
programme in Glasgow’s East End that took much of Clyde’s fan base outwith the city.39 
(They would eventually move to Cumbernauld in 1994.) A few years earlier, however, 
Kilmarnock FC had been at the top of the Scottish game, winning the 1964-65 Scottish 
Football League Division One title under manager Willie Waddell; the following season, they 
even managed to draw to Real Madrid at home 2-2 in the European Cup (they lost on the 
away leg).40 Despite these successes, however, the club’s attendances at their Rugby Park 
ground were small, compared with the major Glasgow clubs; and, by the end of the decade, 
new manager Walter McCrae had initiated an aggressive campaign of talks, promotions, and 
special ticket packages aimed at garnering more community support for the club.41 
Kilmarnock, like Glasgow, was undergoing a programme of redevelopment during the 1960s 
and early 1970s, a prelude to its industrial decline in the late 1970s.42 With the town’s 
industries in flux, by 1969 the club was in dire financial straits, and the majority of its players 
were involved in a dispute with management over unpaid bonuses promised by the club for 
qualifying for European competition. The club’s tour of Rhodesia was, in part, an effort to 
alleviate debt.43 Even the club’s official history, written in 1994 by David Ross, is scathing 
about the tour, stating: ‘Like those England footballers who had given the Nazi salute in pre-
war Berlin, Kilmarnock allowed themselves to be duped by a philosophy of evil.’44 Players 
themselves may have been less politically aware. Kilmarnock’s star player at the time, 
winger Tommy McLean, makes only a brief reference to the Rhodesia tour in his 2013 
autobiography: 
It was no normal tour, with the political situation in Rhodesia causing grave 
concern, after the white supremacist Ian Smith had taken power. The British 
government were opposed to the idea of sports teams going there, but those in 
power at Kilmarnock were set on sending us, and the Scottish Football Association 
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(SFA) could find nothing to stop us. In hindsight I can understand the furore, but at 
the time, I have to admit, the players were not fully aware of the storm brewing. 
We went out to play football and were treated wonderfully by everyone we met, 
black and white, and I hope we made just as good an impression.45 
Kilmarnock played a total of eight matches whilst in Zimbabwe, between 15 May and 9 June 
1970: four matches were in Salisbury, two in Bulawayo, one in Wankie, and one in Umtali 
(now Mutare); and, aside from two against existing club sides, all were against different 
iterations of the ‘national’ football squad, organised by the FAR, and selected by national 
manager Danny McLennan.46 McLean briefly mentions that it was not a luxurious tour, and 
that the team members stayed with ‘local families’ near the different venues across 
Zimbabwe.47 Clyde’s tour the previous year, meanwhile, featured ten matches similarly 
scattered across the country, beginning in Salisbury on 25 May 1969 with a match against a 
Rhodesian National Football League (RNFL) select side, and ending in the capital on 11 and 
15 June with two matches: one against top all-white club side Salisbury Callies, and another 
against the ‘national’ team. On this tour, Clyde primarily played teams assembled from local 
club players.48  
 
Domestic opposition to the Kilmarnock tour 
Almost all of the material on Clyde’s tour in this article comes from Rhodesian newspapers; 
it was discussed very little within the Scottish press, or within the records of the UK Minister 
for Sport Denis Howell or the Secretary of State for Scotland William Ross (at least from 
what appears to be available). Kilmarnock’s tour was covered in greater depth by both. 
Attempts to cancel the MCC’s 1970 invitation of the South African cricket team to England, 
part of which revolved around trying to save the 1970 British Commonwealth Games in 
Edinburgh from a comprehensive boycott, took up the lion’s share of space in newspaper 
columns at the time, as well as the majority of Wilson’s cabinet attention in the run-up to 
their ill-fated June 1970 general election campaign. 
 
The subtleties in the specific circumstances of South African and Rhodesian sport, as well as 
the sports involved, made a great deal of difference to the treatment meted out by the UK 
Government, the Scottish sports authorities, and by pressure groups. Before and after the 
1978 enactment of the Gleneagles Agreement, which explicitly attempted to isolate South 
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African sport, the primary targets of AAM boycotts were rugby, cricket, major sporting 
events, or some combination therein.49 It would prove no different in Scotland; in fact, the 
mass national boycotts and non-cooperation of Edinburgh’s local authority at the city’s 
hosting of the 1986 Commonwealth Games – organised in protest against the Thatcher 
government’s cosy relationship with South Africa – represented one of the AAM’s most 
effective direct actions.50 Long after the collapse of the Smith regime in Zimbabwe, and 
towards the end of Apartheid, Scottish rugby union and cricket were well-documented as 
having ties to South Africa: the former was singled out by Scottish pop-rock band Simple 
Minds as they moved a 1989 concert at Murrayfield Stadium to Meadowbank in protest at 
the Scottish Rugby Union’s (SRU) recent acceptance of an invitation by South Africa. But, 
even up to the 1980s, it was clear that sportspeople in individual sports, especially golf and 
tennis, faced far less hassle if they broke either side of the boycott.51 Football, despite being 
a team sport, similarly escaped scrutiny. In part, this can be seen as a class issue, with trade 
unionists in the AAM often showing reticence at anti-Apartheid campaigns which were seen 
to be targeting working-class Scottish jobs.52 The class and diasporatic dynamics with regard 
to football in ‘white Africa’ thus complicated the use of the sport as a political tool, at least 
in the way that rugby and cricket could be targeted. 
 
The pre-UDI Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had received considerable attention 
within the Scottish press and learned society. The Church of Scotland – both in Scotland and 
amongst Presbyterian missionaries in Malawi – vigorously opposed efforts by the Federation 
government of prime minister Sir Roy Welensky to further incorporate Malawians into a 
Rhodesian state that was hurtling towards a confrontation with the UK Government over its 
protection of white rule.53 The Scottish historiography has yet to place sport within this 
debate. An ‘independent’ Rhodesia’s direct resistance to the British government as a result 
of UDI largely ensured that the British state – rather than NGOs, as was the case with South 
Africa – would take the lead in attempting to isolate the country; the nature of the 
campaign against Rhodesia would thus be very different to the one against South Africa.54 
But states outwith the UK nevertheless pursued Rhodesia’s expulsion from international 
sport with more vigour, especially after Heath’s Conservative government, elected in 1970, 
took a more compromising stance on Rhodesian elite sporting participation.55 Unlike South 
Africa, the country did not explicitly codify racial discrimination within the organisation of its 
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sports; so, in the post-UDI years, the Smith regime and Rhodesia’s sporting officials were 
engaged in a continuous dialogue with FIFA and the IOC for international sporting 
recognition, despite universal African resistance. Eventually, FIFA would ban Rhodesia in 
1970, but the IOC – an organisation which anachronistically claimed to be exempt from 
politics – would not permanently expel the country until 1975, despite threatened African 
boycotts of the 1968 Mexico City and 1972 Munich Olympics forcing the IOC to prevent 
multiracial Rhodesian teams from participating at very late notice.56 Rhodesia’s Paralympic 
team, on the other hand, maintained good relations with the International Stoke Mandeville 
Games Committee throughout, only being prevented from attending the 1976 Paralympics 
in Toronto because the Canadian government banned it from coming.57 Novak refers to 
these discrepancies as the ‘myth of multiracial sport’ in Rhodesia, one that did not exist in 
practicality due to codification of segregated space outwith the literal field of play, including 
sporting venues themselves, clubhouses, and changing rooms, and other boundaries which 
were consistently reinforced due to Rhodesia’s ties and proximity to South Africa. The 
strictures of the Land Tenure Act, in practicality, made mixed sport impossible.58 At least in 
terms of FIFA, Rhodesia and (especially) South Africa had a supporter in FIFA president 
Stanley Rous, the former head of the English Football Association (FA). Despite failing in his 
attempts to stop South Africa’s expulsion, he was routinely viewed as someone who had 
frustrated the attempts of the ‘Global South’ to gain stronger control within the game. After 
Brazilian João Havelange deposed Rous in 1974, Africa’s white regimes were far more 
isolated within world football.59 
 
As far as the SFA was concerned, FIFA’s recognition of the Smith regime was validation 
enough to allow the Kilmarnock trip, and Clyde’s trip the previous year.60 The ineffectual UK 
Government efforts to stop the tour were led by the Minister for Sport Denis Howell’s 
office. For all that was made to show a united public front over Rhodesia, in the case of 
Kilmarnock these pains were minimal; there were no public statements from Howell on the 
subject. His office had first learned of the tour through the Scottish Office on 14 April 1970; 
they found out through the Foreign Office, who had in turn been tipped off by a South 
African press agency looking for information on the tour.61 The Government were given only 
a month to prevent the tour from happening, and used their power to attempt to persuade 
the SFA to convince Kilmarnock to call off the tour. Sir John Lang, the deputy chairman of 
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the Sports Council, noted on 15 April that that alleged tour starting a month hence ‘implies 
that the arrangements are far advanced’.62 In the immediate run-up to an election, 
managing public opinion was also an issue, especially with regard to who, if anybody, would 
respond on the Government side. Whilst sporting tours abroad were ostensibly Howell’s 
responsibility, there was debate within the civil service about whether or not William Ross, 
the Scottish secretary, should lead the response. There was an added complication here; 
namely, that Ross was Kilmarnock’s MP. One telegram from a civil servant the Scottish 
Office in Edinburgh to their counterparts in London stated ‘in view of [Ross’s] constituency 
interest’ a statement by Howell ‘would place him in an embarrassing position if he were 
asked to comment on a statement made by another minister on an issue of this sort.’63 In a 
16 April 1970 letter from Scottish Office mandarin Joseph Kidd to Lang, encouraging Howell 
to make a statement, Kidd stated: ‘[Ross] has commented that if Mr Howell makes a public 
statement indicating disapproval “I would not dissent from it”’. Ross, however, reserved the 
right to comment on it beforehand.64 The response from Lang came eight days later on 24 
April, stating that Howell ‘would prefer to work behind the scenes if at all possible’.65 (One 
interviewee for this article, club historian David Ross – no relation – a fourteen-year-old boy 
at the time, but a future Labour activist and politician, states that Ross told him years 
afterwards that he was ‘very strongly against it’ and ‘certainly not ambivalent about it’.66)  In 
sum, the total of Howell’s attempts to stop Kilmarnock from travelling to Rhodesia 
amounted to one letter, sent by Lang to the chairman of the SFA, begging the Association to 
convince the club not to go.67 
 
Bryan Glass states that opposition to the RF was significant in Scotland, and the Church of 
Scotland were crucial in steering Scottish public opinion against the pre- and post-UDI 
regimes in Salisbury.68 William Ross’s lack of a public reaction to the tour, however, tells us 
that this opposition was far from universal. David Ross states that ‘a lot of people were 
sympathetic towards the Smith regime, with much talk about kith and kin and so forth’.69 
This ambivalence included those within the Ayrshire branches of the Kirk itself. In the run-up 
to the tour, the Presbytery of Irvine and Kilmarnock debated whether or not to condemn it; 
a motion of ‘regret’ was defeated by 29 votes to 19.70 Central to the debate was whether or 
not Kilmarnock were playing mixed clubs, but one minister, Rev WM Reid of Hurlford, 
stated: ‘I don’t think the question of how teams will be composed is important. The 
13 
 
question at issue is the whole basis of the present regime in Rhodesia.’71 The majority 
disagreed: WA Caldwell of Kilmarnock believed that ‘the Christian attitude was not to opt 
out but to opt in’, while WB Gilmour of Kilmarnock believed it ‘ridiculous’ that, for instance, 
‘churchmen from Rhodesia could be banned from visiting Scotland under such a policy.’72 
Local government bodies were similarly divided: Galston Town Council, for instance, wrote a 
letter of protest to Kilmarnock (prompting an angry rebuke from the club in the process).73 
Ayr County Council, meanwhile, could not quite bring themselves to even vote on the 
matter: when Kilmaurs councillor Robert Beattie brought a motion of protest in front of the 
Council, the chair told him he was out of order as he did not follow procedure in bringing 
the matter to a vote. A brief debate ensued: one councillor stated that ‘Kilmarnock FC are 
being used for propaganda by the Smith regime’, whilst another attempted to reiterate the 
alleged sport/politics divide.74 Beattie, however, had noted that opposition included shop 
stewards at the Massey Ferguson tractor factory in town, who had protested to the club.75 
 
The attention it received in the print media, including the tour itself, was scattershot. 
Glasgow’s tabloid Daily Record, for instance, promised at the outset of Kilmarnock’s trip that 
team captain Billy Dickson would pen columns on the trip for the paper, ‘provid[ing] a 
service second to none in information and match reports’. This never truly materialised; 
and, even with this announcement, the coverage was in the sports pages, rather than the 
front, where the interlinked Commonwealth Games crisis and MCC tour were getting 
attention.76 Kilmarnock managed to make it into one newspaper’s leader: that of Dundee’s 
Conservative-aligned tabloid Courier and Advertiser. Here, the club received praise for the 
trip: 
Kilmarnock Football Club are off to Rhodesia. They will play eight games out there. 
They are quite right to go in spite of enthusiasm from Whitehall. Rhodesians will 
have a chance to see a first-class Scottish club in action. And the presence of these 
sporting ambassadors will show the vindictive attitude of the British Government 
towards Rhodesia is certainly not shared by very many people – particularly in 
Scotland.77 
The public discussion, with the exception of a few letters to the editor, was even quite small 
within the Kilmarnock Standard itself. 
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The Rhodesian press, on the other hand, gave far more thorough coverage, and add another 
wrinkle to what was going on within the community and Scotland-wide debates themselves. 
The veracity of the post-UDI press is a significant issue. The two major national daily 
newspapers, Salisbury’s Rhodesia Herald and The Chronicle of Bulawayo, were owned by the 
Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company monopoly, part of the Argus group of South 
Africa. Whilst using ostensibly ‘liberal’ language, in practice, after UDI, they had become 
heavily censored, with their editors more or less approved by the increasingly anxious Smith 
government, and often indulging in similar basic discourses on race and power to those of 
the RF. All papers who had published opposing viewpoints had been closed down in the 
years surrounding UDI, while broadcasting had been seized by the state. Papers’ sole 
audience was the ‘European’ community.78 So the ‘truth’ of what these papers covered (or, 
more to the point, what they did not cover) is suspect. While David Ross states that no 
official supporters travelled with the club, the Rhodesia Herald, towards the end of the tour, 
aired the views of one person who travelled with them: Kilmarnock restaurateur, publican, 
and shareholder in the club William Ross ‘Cubby’ Anderson, whom the Herald referred to as 
‘Kilmarnock’s No. 1 supporter’. When interviewed by Alan Peden, Anderson presented 
himself as standing up to a rebellion back home: 
There have been threats to ostracize me and my bars when I return… And a leading 
Union official from one of the largest manufacturing complexes in Kilmarnock was 
openly opposed to my visit to Rhodesia. Local councillors have intimated that it 
would be better if I had visited Rhodesia on a private holiday rather than associate 
myself with the Kilmarnock visit.79 
It, of course, behoved the Herald to present this resistance in a grandiose light. But the 
Rhodesian coverage is more enlightening when it comes to the complicity of SFA secretary 
Willie Allan in arranging both Kilmarnock and (especially) Clyde’s visits. In contrast to the 
SFA’s compliance regarding Celtic’s mooted 1968 tour, Whitehall correspondence in the 
run-up to Kilmarnock’s 1970 tour sensed evasiveness on the part of Allan when stating that 
the Association could not prevent their clubs from touring Rhodesia. In his letter to Kidd, 
Lang stated: 
I must say that I am not surprised at the attitude taken by the Secretary of the 
Scottish FA. In my experience Mr Allan is singularly non-cooperational over this kind 
of thing and is unwilling to accept a detailed explanation which I gave to him some 
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18 months ago why the Government feel they ought not to seek legal powers to 
stop the club from undertaking an overseas tour.80 
It was not just that Allan was ‘non-cooperational’; there was also genuine enthusiasm there. 
In an interview with the Rhodesia Herald’s Len Brown during Clyde’s visit the previous year, 
Allan, who accompanied the club, was given considerable space to discuss his impressions of 
Rhodesian football. Here, it was revealed that Allan had been approached himself by FAR 
secretary George Kerr to ask for permission to invite Clyde, ‘and ended up “and why don’t 
you come and have a look-see for yourself?”’.81 Rhodesia, here, was seen as the latest 
destination of the well-travelled Allan, who was in part looking to advance the interests of 
the Scottish game.82 
 
The Scottish diaspora in Zimbabwe 
Kerr, the FAR secretary who invited Clyde and Kilmarnock to Rhodesia, exemplified an 
additional complication in trying to convince the football clubs not to head there. This was 
noted by the Scottish Office when discussing Kilmarnock’s trip, with civil servant IGF Gray 
detailing the invitation of the tour as such: ‘Apparently the Secretary of the Rhodesian 
Football Association – a Scot himself – had been in Scotland about a week ago and had 
arranged a 3-week tour by Kilmarnock in Rhodesia’.83 As a central figure in the FAR, Kerr 
would have been central to any negotiations with FIFA on the right of Rhodesia to 
participate in international football competitions. Kerr, however, was certainly not the only 
Scot involved in Rhodesian football at time, either at its heart or at its peripheries. Perhaps 
more conspicuous was Danny McLennan, the national team manager. McLennan was born 
in Stirling in 1925; and died in Crail, Fife, in 2004. In a colourful career, the former Stirling 
Albion footballer and Berwick Rangers manager would go on to coach (amongst many other 
overseas club sides) Malawi, Iran, Iraq, Libya, the Philippines, Fiji, and Mauritius (twice).84 As 
any national team manager would be, McLennan was widely interviewed in the Rhodesian 
press, especially during Kilmarnock’s visit, where the Ayrshire club essentially faced different 
combinations of the national squad. 
 
In her recent work on the pre-1930 Scottish diaspora, Tanja Bueltmann has noted that, 
whilst a numerically far smaller number of Scottish emigrants travelled to Africa than to 
North America and the Antipodes, Scots were nevertheless conspicuous by their 
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participation in societies which marked them as members of a separate polity within the 
British Empire.85 Sport was certainly included within this remit; not just for the likes of 
Highland gatherings, but also other sports: Bulawayo had cycling associated with their 
Caledonian society around 1900.86 John Mackenzie and Nigel Dalziel similarly note that in 
pre-1914 South Africa Scottish societies typically included within their remit Highland 
gatherings.87 The overall public discourse on Scottish participation in imperialism in Africa 
stands out for its positivity in stressing a uniquely radical and more socially just vision of 
British imperialism, usually with specific references to Scotland’s missionary connections 
with Malawi. It is a variation on the deeply-entrenched ‘lad o’ pairts’ myth of Scottish 
egalitarianism that David McCrone noted in his influential 1992 book on the sociology of 
Scotland.88 This discourse is seen to manifest itself in treatments given to missionary 
pioneer David Livingstone, whom MacKenzie refers to being used paradoxically and 
problematically, after his death, as a ‘patron saint of imperialism’, a proto-African 
nationalist, and a domestic hero within Scottish civic society itself.89  However, there is a 
much darker side to these discourses which is and was less emphasised in the public sphere; 
and, as Glass states, even Scottish newspapers’ coverage of decolonisation in Africa in the 
post-war years was structured around familiar assumptions of British racial and military 
superiority.90 In the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, and South Africa, Scots had historically been 
members of a highly privileged labour hierarchy. This included military service, dedicated as 
it was to the preservation of the racial status quo; the post-war South African government 
even maintained its Scottish regiments, at least in part in an effort to appeal to conservative 
sections of Scottish/British society.91 It is beyond the remit of this article to discuss what 
Jonathan Hyslop refers to as ‘white labourism’.92 However, as Duncan Money has recently 
discussed regarding migrant Glaswegian riveters on the Copperbelt in the 1930s, even 
militant trade unionists from Scotland who arrived to work in Zambia understood their own 
rights and the rights of African workers as not part of the same struggle.93 One of the most 
powerful Scots in pre-UDI Rhodesia, meanwhile – baker, Bulawayo mayor, and Southern 
Rhodesia Labour Party heavyweight Donald Macintyre – argued passionately against laws 
which would have put wages for European and African workers on a more equitable 
setting.94 Macintyre and his fellow Scots in Bulawayo civic society did not see themselves 
just as Brits: they prided themselves on what the late Terence Ranger states were leadership 
qualities ‘very different from the false politeness of the English gentleman’.95 
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Celtic’s Tommy Burns certainly saw himself as part of a privileged labour hierarchy within 
Rhodesian football. Burns, perhaps the highest-profile Scottish footballer to play in 
Zimbabwe, in his 1989 autobiography (co-written with Hugh Keevins) only makes a page-
long reference to his brief Summer 1975 loan period at Salisbury Callies. Burns and his Celtic 
teammate Rob Hannah received this opportunity via the network of Scots émigrés present 
in Zimbabwe: the manager of the all-white Salisbury Callies was a Scot, Danny Murphy, a 
Celtic supporter, who had requested young guest players for a summer tour of duty at his 
club. Burns ruefully noted the conspicuousness of his work circumstances, especially when 
recounting a ‘race riot’ involving Chibuku, another club: 
One of the coaches of our all-white side, who had taken umbrage at a late 
challenge made on our goalkeeper, had simply walked on to the pitch and flattened 
the offending player with a single punch. As all hell broke loose, the fans tried to 
scale the fencing to exact revenge, and truncheon-wielding policemen lashed out at 
the fingers of those trying to invade the pitch, sending them slipping back down the 
wire… Even at its most frisky, the Calton was never like that, though having seen 
the living and working conditions those people had to endure I could understand 
their volatile temperament.96 
Burns was not in Zimbabwe long; however, others stayed for much longer, and either 
worked their way into positions of considerable responsibility, or were offered positions 
through a similar network of expats that recruited Burns and Hannah. The situation was 
notably similar in the all-white (and very popular) National Football League of South Africa 
(NFL), which existed from 1959 to 1977. Despite more glamorous British footballers like 
Bobby Moore, George Best, Bobby Charlton, and Stanley Matthews being lured to the NFL 
for short-term contracts, Chris Bolsmann states that the majority of players in the NFL (75% 
of whom were from overseas) were ‘recruited from the lower leagues of English and 
Scottish professional football’, many of whom continued their trades in South Africa, with 
the government encouraging their migration and promising employment. Hellenic’s Scottish 
goalkeeper, Jackie Wren, even found his job by responding to an advert in a Scottish 
newspaper.97  
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For the most part, it was this more itinerant calibre of footballer and administrator which 
ended up in Zimbabwe during the period.  It is telling that during the period of Clyde’s and 
Kilmarnock’s visits, The Chronicle published via Reuters upcoming fixtures and scores within 
the top two divisions of Scottish football (for English football, it was the top four divisions), 
as well as in-depth coverage of Scottish Cup draws, serving an expat market which would 
have existed in Bulawayo.98 Kerr and McLennan were not the only Scots who Clyde and 
Kilmarnock encountered on their trips. Tommy Ballantyne, one of Rhodesia’s capped 
internationals, faced off against Clyde as part of the RNFL team; Ballantyne had previously 
been with Dundee United and several English clubs.99 One SFA referee was brought over 
from Scotland for Clyde’s tour, JW Patterson.100 But, during Kilmarnock’s visit to Bulawayo 
the following year, a late replacement referee had been arranged in the form of ‘Bulawayo 
Scot John Henderson’.101 
 
It was Clyde’s and Kilmarnock’s visits to Bulawayo, in particular, which the Rhodesian press 
explicitly tied to the wider Scottish diaspora within Rhodesia. Scots were crucial in the 
founding of the city; as Ranger states, the city’s Caledonian society was ‘the city’s most 
influential association’, with its annual Burns Supper ‘used by national politicians to make 
policy statements’.102 Upon coming to the city, the Clyde team were presented with a 
seventy-fifth anniversary tie, whilst SFA secretary Allan and club director Ian Paterson were 
presented with a plaque from the City of Bulawayo from Alderman James Stuart McNeillie, a 
blacksmith and another former Rhodesian Labour mayor of the city who had originally come 
from and been apprenticed in Scotland.103 The Bulawayo Pipe Band would play during 
Clyde’s matches against a local select on 4 June.104 A year later, Frank Noble of the Pipe 
Band would greet Kilmarnock at Bulawayo Airport, whilst wearing Highland dress, to the 
tune of ‘Scotland the Brave’: The Chronicle featured a front-page picture of him lending his 
bagpipes to winger Willie Waddell (no known relation to the former manager). The caption 
noted that the welcome party at Bulawayo Airport, along with Noble, ‘included local officials 
(mostly Scots)’.105 It is entirely possible that, as Tommy McLean states, players did not view 
their trips as being inherently political. But nevertheless, aside from the usual tourist trips to 
the Victoria Falls, players certainly engaged in and witnessed acts that would be deemed 
political, loaded as they were with colonial symbolism.106 Upon their arrival in Rhodesia, 
Kilmarnock’s players were gifted safari suits by one of Rhodesian football’s sponsors.107 Ian 
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Smith and his wife also attended one of the team’s matches in Salisbury.108 Meanwhile, 
whilst staying in Bulawayo, after being officially entertained by Mayor Max Logan, the club 
visited the grave of Cecil Rhodes himself.109 
 
Disappointment in white solidarity? 
The Rhodesian press’s motifs of this visit drew largely upon Scots’ histories in the colony. In 
the minds of some Kilmarnock residents, emigrating to Rhodesia was indeed no different 
than moving to other parts of what was termed the ‘white dominions’ or ‘white 
Commonwealth’ (including South Africa), hence the muffled criticism within the town 
itself.110 However, the Rhodesia Herald’s and The Chronicle’s treatments hid very real 
insecurities regarding the government’s policies to encourage European emigration to the 
country. In the years surrounding UDI, the majority of the incoming white population came 
not from Britain or Europe, but from Zambia, Kenya, and Congo – settlers fleeing African 
nationalist governments – along with South African Afrikaners who were looking for cheap 
farming land.111 British immigrants to Rhodesia long had dominance within the settler 
hierarchy and more liberal immigration rules applied to them – often at the expense of 
Jews, Poles, Greeks, and others; however, after UDI, the Smith government became less 
selective.112 There was a reason for this: the settler population was demographically 
unstable: in the run-up to UDI (1961-65) and during the years of the civil war (1973-79), 
emigration was a major problem, so much so that the white population saw a decrease in 
net migration during these years. The years 1966-72 overall may have been years of 
population increase, but the long-term nature of white migration to Rhodesia could be best 
described as short-term and transient.113 What appeared in the Rhodesian press, as well as 
the government’s internal propaganda and external public relations material, did not reveal 
the Smith government’s rightful paranoia about its ultimate demise.114 
 
The Rhodesian press’s treatment of Clyde and Kilmarnock hints at some of these underlying 
issues, and the broader, shifting racial hierarchy beyond that. The part-time Clyde, in one 
piece by Len Brown of the Rhodesia Herald, seemingly had their skill sets analysed, 
discussing as it did where each of the players worked, a collection of working- and lower 
middle-class jobs. Goalkeeper Tom McCulloch was noted as working at the Glasgow Post 
Office Planning Department, ‘his job… to look 15 years ahead to the city’s telephone 
20 
 
requirements and he is currently studying for a special exam’, the second part of which he 
took whilst in Salisbury.115 An article like this, if not necessarily a pitch for recruitment, 
might be viewed in the context of a settler society that had trouble recruiting skilled 
labourers. Free labour, it turned out, also worked fine for the papers. As Rhodesian sport 
struggled for recognition and legitimacy from world sport’s governing bodies, the country’s 
newspapers solicited advice from the touring clubs on the development of football. ‘From 
what I’ve seen on my short stay in Rhodesia so far’, stated Willie Allan during Clyde’s 1969 
tour, ‘my advice to you, soccerwise, is to concentrate on coaching in the schools and the 
young ones show promise.’116 Kilmarnock manager Walter McCrae, meanwhile, while 
suggesting Rhodesian footballers needed to improve at finishing in front of the goal, stated: 
I have been tremendously impressed by the organization of Kilmarnock’s tour on 
this trip by your Football Association secretary George Kerr. We’ve undertaken 
tours in many parts of the world, and in comparison the efficiency of the 
organization in Rhodesia is first class.117 
The Rhodesian dailies used the language of hands-on instruction to describe what Clyde and 
Kilmarnock were doing. Clyde’s 3-1 victory in their 1969 tour against an RNFL eleven at 
Salisbury was headlined in The Chronicle ‘CLYDE GIVE LOCALS FITBA’ LESSONS’.118 But next 
year, for Kilmarnock’s tour, the Rhodesia Herald’s Alan Peden went further, quoting the club 
captain, full-back and Scottish international Billy Dickson, as stating that he had 
enthusiastically taken up an offer to coach in Rhodesia for free during the close season next 
year. Peden also noted that Dickson, trainer Hugh Allan, and others had been in ‘great 
demand for coaching sessions’, stating at the end of his piece that: ‘This has been the 
essence of this successful tour, the willingness of every player to go anywhere at any time in 
a genuine effort to further soccer in this country.’119 
 
The words are only half the story here, and the Rhodesia Herald’s pictures for Peden’s 
article reveal a bit more of the racial subtext at play. Two pictures were shown above the 
Dickson interview to show how ‘the Kilmarnock players have attracted the children – of all 
races’. In the larger photograph, John Gilmour and Ross Mathie are shown in the centre of a 
circle of white children with matching kit at Alexandra Junior School in Salisbury; in the 
smaller photo, Tommy McLean is photographed in a street scene ‘show[ing] his famous ball 
control to a crowd of piccanins during a visit to a township’.120 A week earlier, The Chronicle 
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had similarly photographed McLean and Jim McCulloch in the streets of Bulawayo with the 
caption: ‘The Makokoba Piccanins went straight into action yesterday against the 
Kilmarnock Duo – and what the game lacked in finesse it made up for in enthusiasm and 
spontaneous fun… No referee, no whistles, no goalposts, no rules – but great fun for all 
concerned.’121 This represented what Alan Cousins states was a prominent trope of 
‘Africans’ which typically appeared in the Rhodesian media, as being a ‘happy’ and ‘childlike’ 
mass .122 
 
Kilmarnock’s appearance in Bulawayo adds a different dimension to the club’s experience of 
race and ethnicity while on the trip, for the trip also highlighted ethnic difference within 
Zimbabwe’s African community. The Rhodesia Herald noted that Kilmarnock’s players were 
rumoured to be present for a major ‘European league soccer’ match during the first term in 
Bulawayo.123 But the integrated, mixed-race sides the FAR had facing the club typically did 
not do well against the visiting Scots. One of two tastes of club football Kilmarnock received 
on the pitch while in Zimbabwe, on the other hand, saw the match end in a 1-1 draw. That 
game came against Mashonaland United on Tuesday, 26 May at the Callies Ground in 
Bulawayo. Mashonaland United (now Zimbabwe Saints) were borne out of the well-
organised Bulawayo African Football Association. Football in the city was mostly dominated 
by Shona, and Mashonaland United was viewed a conduit for Shona identity vis-à-vis 
Ndebele identity, as represented by cross-town rivals Highlanders.124 Martin Lee’s match 
report for The Chronicle began by likening the result to a crucial episode in Scottish military 
history, stating: ‘Until last night I would have said the Battle of Flodden in 1513 was 
probably the biggest blow suffered by any collection of Scots. But now you can add the 
name Callies’ Field, 1970, to the battle scars.’125 The final whistle precipitated a pitch 
invasion by jubilant supporters. After the match, both Mashonaland United and Kilmarnock 
were entertained at the home of club chairman Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, who would later 
serve as health minister during the early years of ZANU-PF government.126 The surprise with 
which the European media greeted this draw, and the martial language used to frame it, 
was indicative that Kilmarnock’s interactions within the ‘mixed’ world of Rhodesian football 
were still highly mediated. 
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By contrast, Kilmarnock thoroughly demolished the all-white Salisbury Callies 10-0 – the 
same match that Ian Smith attended.127 But, as the scenario with Celtic in the previous years 
shows, even the generally approving Rhodesian press noted that their desperation for 
legitimacy resulted in them not getting the very best representatives of Scottish football to 
come to their shores. This was especially shown toward the end of Clyde’s visit, where 
Martin Lee of The Chronicle’s account of an RNFL eleven’s 3-0 defeat at The Showgrounds in 
Bulawayo was scathing about the quality of the display, where Clyde looked good only in 
comparison to the amateurish Rhodesian side: 
Even the one-sided business would have been easier to bear had Clyde had some 
ball-artists to entertain. But they are no more than a workmanship side, 
unaccustomed to having so much space to work in. You cannot expect caviare 
when fish-and-chips is a staple diet.128 
This similar attitude was confirmed by David Ross regarding the reception of the Kilmarnock 
tour amongst the club’s supporters itself: the overriding emotion not being one of disgust 
with support of the Smith regime, but disappointment that the struggling club could not 
arrange a better programme of matches for a summer tour: 
It was regarded [as a] disappointment because we were used to reading about Killie 
going to America… so they had been four times in the 1960s, with varying degrees 
of success, and they met big teams there. Bayern Munich, Wolves, West Ham 
United… These were really big sides. And then all of a sudden we were going to this 
Rhodesia, which was a place nobody really know about, apart from it was on the 
news.129 
Perhaps McCrae felt the same way himself. He would eventually leave trainer Hugh Allan in 
charge of Kilmarnock, as he went back to Scotland halfway through the tour, in preparation 
for departing to watch the 1970 World Cup in Mexico.130 The tours would ultimately pass by 
as a small footnote in the histories of Clyde and Kilmarnock, let alone the rest of Scottish 
football, during a stretch of time which arguably contained its greatest triumphs and darkest 
moments. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has used a fairly unremarked episode within the history of Scottish football to 
illuminate much wider issues surrounding post-war Scotland’s relationship with the ‘white’ 
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regimes of Africa. Indeed, as Scotland and Scottish football had such deep historic 
relationships with Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, and South Africa, it is highly problematic to 
attempt to separate these tours from broader historic dynamics within labour and 
governance within the region, ones which might have occasionally subsumed ‘Scottish-ness’ 
within the domain of ‘British-ness’, but nevertheless still placed many Scots into positions of 
considerable administrative power within Zimbabwean society and sport. The 
historiography on the Scottish diaspora is wide-ranging and diverse, but the Rhodesian 
press’s treatments of the 1969 and 1970 tours tells us that our analysis of the diaspora 
during the post-war period needs to continue – as it has done more recently – to directly 
engage with imperialism and decolonisation, and with specifically Scottish (and indeed 
‘four-nations’) perspectives on imperial identities.131. This article additionally hints that, 
aside from Glass’s work on the Church of Scotland’s reaction to events in Rhodesia, the 
scholarly historiography on Scottish civic society’s connections and reactions to events in 
the region has further to go. In the instances discussed in this article, the residue of Empire 
had little to do with the well-maintained cricket pitches typically envisaged by those at the 
start of the 1970 Commonwealth Games, and everything to do with the global civic and 
industrial networks which existed within Scotland’s working- and lower-middle classes who 
watched and participated in football.    
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